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Judith Hanebury, Q.C."

Cooperative Environmental
Assessments: Their Increasing
Role in Oil and Gas Projects

As the subject matter of "environment" is not specifically assigned in the
Constitution to only the federal government or the provinces, there has been an
increasing trend toward cooperative environmental assessment processes to
avoidjurisdictional friction points. This article describes the relevantjurisdictional
friction points that have encouraged this trend and describes some issues and
considerations that have arisen in relation to recent cooperative environmental
assessments carried out for oil and gas projects.
Dans la mesure obi la constitution canadienne n'indique pas clairement si
renvironnementest une comp6tence f6ddrale ou provinciale, les deux paliers de
gouvernement ont de plus en plus tendance 6 mener le processus d'dvaluation
environnementale en concertation de manibre b 6viter des frictions. Cet article
tente de cemer les diverses sources de friction qui ont favoris6 cette tendance i
la concertation et fait le point sur les difficult~s et les considdrations qui ont surgi
r6cemment b la suite d'6valuations environnementales conjointes de projets
d'exploration p6troliere et gazibre.

* General Counsel, National Energy Board. The views expressed herein are those of the author
and not those of the National Energy Board. The author wishes to thank Ms. Susan Gudgeon,
paralegal, for her very able and patient assistance throughout the many drafts of this article.
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Introduction
As the case law has noted,' the ConstitutionAct, 1867 does not assign
environment as a specific head of power to either the provincial or federal
governments, whereas jurisdiction over the various aspects of energyrelated projects has been specifically assigned. The federal government
has constitutional jurisdiction over the transportation of energy both
interprovincially and internationally. 2 As a result of the Natural Resource
Transfer Agreements, 3 the provinces have authority over the exploration

1. Friends of the Oldman River Dam Society v. Canada(Minister of Transport), [1992] 1
S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter Oldman River].
2. See ConstitutionAct, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 92(1 0)(a), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985,
App. II, No. 5.
3. See the Transfer Agreements, Manitoba NaturalResources Act, S.C. 1930, c. 29, Sch.,
para. 18;Alberta NaturalResourcesAct, 20-21 Geo. V, S.C. c, 3, Sch. para. 18; Saskatchewan
NaturalResources Act, S.C. 1930, c. 41, Sch., para. 1.
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for, development and production of energy within the province. As well
the provinces have jurisdiction over the intraprovincial transportation of
energy. The federal government has rights over the development and4
transportation of energy resources in the north and the offshore areas,
although in some areas those rights are shared.
An energy project subject to either federal or provincial jurisdiction
can have environmental ramifications in areas of both federal and
provincial jurisdiction. For example, while the federal government is
responsible for the fisheries resource, provincial governments have
responsibilities in relation to provincial bodies of water. Impacts on air
quality can also affect both federal and provincial areas ofjurisdiction. As
a result of issues such as these, the question of how to delineate this joint
jurisdiction over the environment has been increasingly before the courts
in recent years. The constitutional challenge facing the courts was aptly
described by La Forest J. in R. v. Hydro-Quibec5 where he said in his
judgment foT the majority,
[t]he all-important duty of Parliament and the provincial legislatures to
make full use of the legislative powers respectively assigned to them in
protecting the environment has inevitably placed upon the courts the
burden of progressively defining the extent to which these powers may be
used to that end. In performing this task, it is incumbent on the courts to
secure the basic balance between the two levels of government envisioned
by the Constitution. However, in doing so, they must be mindful that the
Constitution must be interpreted in a manner that is fully responsive to
emerging realities and to the nature of the subject matter sought to be
regulated. Given the pervasive and diffuse nature of the environment, this
reality poses particular difficulties in this context.6
A number of the recent court decisions that have sought to secure this
basic balance between the two levels of government are in the area of
environmental impact assessment. An environmental impact assessment
can trigger several jurisdictional friction points,7 two of which occur
frequently: the scope of the project to be assessed and the environmental
effects to be considered. These two matters will be briefly examined next
in this article. The recent use in oil and gas project proposals of coopera-

4. For example, accords were entered into between the federal government and the provinces
of Newfoundland (Canada-NewfoundlandAtlantic Accord ImplementationAct, S.C. 1987, c.
3) and Nova Scotia (Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act, S.C. 1988, c. 28) for management of the offshore energy r'esources.
5. [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213 [hereinafter Hydro-Qudbec].
6. Ibid. at 267.
7. For a more complete discussion of the four areas of jurisdictional friction that occur when
an environmental assessment is undertaken see J. Hanebury, "Environmental Impact Assessment and the Constitution: The Never-Ending Story" (2000) 9 J.E.L.P. 169.
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tive environmental assessment processes to avoid jurisdictional issues
will be noted and some issues and considerations raised by those
cooperative assessment processes will be explored.
I. JurisdictionalFrictionPoints
1. The Scope of the Project
The first jurisdictional friction point that can arise in an environmental
impact assessment is the determination of the scope of the project to be
assessed. The scope of the project has been the subject of significani
judicial consideration in the past few years.8 The issue to be decided in
every assessment is the ambit of the project subject to the environmental
impact assessment. Is it limited to the proposal as described by the
proponent, or should it and can it be expanded to include other projects
or activities?
Under the CanadianEnvironmentalAssessmentAct9 there has been a
series of casesO that have considered the question of how broadly z
federal entity undertaking an assessment (responsible authority) is able
to scope a project to be assessed. These cases have not considered the
constitutional basis for scoping but rather the statutory interpretation ol
the relevant provisions of the CEAA. The ability to scope a project is sel
out in s. 15:
(1) The scope of the project in relation to which an environmental
assessment is to be conducted shall be determined by
(a) the responsible authority; or
(b) where the project is referred to a mediator or a review
panel, the Minister, after consulting with the responsible
authority.

8. See B. Hobby et al., Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, An Annotated Guidi
(Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book Inc., 1997) at 11-52 where it is suggested that the reasoninl

in the Oldman River case can be used to support the inclusion of related undertakings in
scoping exercise. [hereinafter CEAA, An Annotated Guide].
9. S.C. 1992, c. 37 [hereinafter CEAA].
10. See Citizens'MiningCouncilof Newfoundlandand Labradorv. Canada(Ministerof th,
Environment), [1999] F.C.J. No. 273 (F.C.T.D.) [hereinafter Citizens' Mining];Manitoba',
Future Forest Alliance v. Canada (Minister of the Envirounent), [t9991 F.C.I. No. 90
(F.C.T.D.) [hereinafter Manitoba] and Friendsof the West CountryAssn. v. Canada(Ministe
of Fisheriesand Oceans), [1999] F.C.J. No. 1515 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter Sunpine]. As well, a
the time of writing, there are a number of cases on scoping that have yet to be heard or decided
John Lavoie v. Canada (Minister of Fisheriesand Oceans) [A-61 1-00]; Inverhuron an
District Ratepayers' Association v. Canada (Minister of the Environment) [A-427-00]; an,
Hamilton-Wentworth (RegionalMunicipalityofp v. Canada(Ministerof the Environment)['1

1400-99].
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(2) For the purposes of conducting an environmental assessment in
respect of two or more projects,
(a)
the responsible authority, or
where at least one of the projects is referred to a mediator
(b)
or a review panel, the Minister, after consulting with the responsible
authority, may determine that the projects are so closely related that
they can be considered to form a single project.
(3) Where a project is in relation to a physical work, an environmental
assessment shall be conducted in respect of every construction, operation,
modification, decommissioning, abandonment or other undertaking in
relation to that physical work that is proposed by the proponent or that is,
in the opinion of
the responsible authority, or
where the project is referred to a mediator or a review
(b)
panel, the Minister, after consulting with the responsible authority,
likely to be carried out in relation to that physical work.
(a)

While none of the cases to date considering the scope of the project under
the CEAA has dealt with the specific constitutional questions raised by
expanding the scope of a project, earlier case law under the Environmental Assessment Review Process Guidelines Order" has considered the
broader constitutional issues. 2 From the case law under the CEAA and
the EARPGO 3 the following principles can be distilled.
The Supreme Court of Canada has made it clear under the EARPGO
that, where there is the requisite underlying legislative authority, the
scope of the project subject to assessment could be broadened to permit
an assessment of the environmental effects ' 4 of related provincially
regulated projects. However, with the recent interpretation given to s.
15(3) of the CEAA' 5 , the scope of the project appears to have been limited
to undertakings directly tied to the proposed physical work, such as its
construction and operation, or ancillary or subsidiary undertakings, i.e.
the construction of a temporary work camp for the workers constructing
the project that is subject to assessment. The breadth of the constitutional
authority available in relation to the scope of the project was not
considered in light of the specific wording of the statute. Consequently,
the constitutional authority to scope a project subject to assessment may
be broader than the existing statutory authority under the CEAA. Deter-

S.O.R./184-467 [hereinafter EARPGO].
Oldman River, supra note I and, to some extent, Quebec (Attorney General)v. Canada
(NationalEnergy Board), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 159 [hereinafter Creel although no constitutional
issue was raised.
13. Cree, ibid.
14. At least on areas of federal jurisdiction such as navigable waters and fisheries.
15. Sunpine, supra note 10.
11.

12.
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mining the scope of the project subject to assessment is one of the
jurisdictional friction points that has led to an increasing number of legal
challenges and has encouraged the development of cooperative environmental assessment processes.
2. The Effects to be Considered
The second jurisdictional trouble point arises once the scope of the project
has been determined. It is a determination of which factors will be
assessed. Subsections 16(1) and (2) of the CEAA set out the factors to be
considered in an environmental assessment. The assessing body is
required to consider the environmental effects of the project including
any "cumulative effects that are likely to result from the project in
combination with other projects or activities that have been or will be
carried out' '

6

and their significance. 17 There is no distinction made in the

CEAA between environmental effects on areas of provincial jurisdiction
and environmental effects on areas of federal jurisdiction. The legislation
implies that all effects are to be considered. Inlight of the case law to date
undertheEARPGO," such a wide-ranging consideration of environmental effects may raise a constitutional issue.
CEAA s. 16(1)(a) provides that "the environmental effects" are to be
considered and there is no restriction against a consideration of effects on
provincial areas of jurisdiction. Despite this, both the courts and commentators on the CEAA have suggested that when the trigger is an
authorization included in the Law List Regulations 9 the effects to be
considered should be limited to those within federal jurisdiction.20
However, in the one case to date on point under the CEAA21 the trigger
was an approval under the Navigable Waters ProtectionAct. This is the
same legislation as was considered by La Forest J. in the Supreme Court
of Canada decision in Oldman River,when he held that the environmental
effects to be considered under the EARPGO were limited to those effects
on federal areas of jurisdiction. No case considering the CEAA has
addressed the question of whether this limitation on the effects that can

16. Supra note.9, s. 16(l)(a)

17. Ibid., s. 16(1)(b).
18. Supra note 11. For a detailed description see as well the article referenced in supra note 6.
19. S.O.R./94-636.
20. Hobby et al., supra note 7 at 11-56 where it is stated that "[t]he environmental effects of
a project with a 'regulatory' trigger [s. 5(1)(d)] can only be those which may have an impact
on the areas of federal responsibility affected."
21. Sunpine, supra note 10.
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be considered applies to assessments triggered pursuant to other regulatory approvals.
In light of past case law it is possible that furtherjudicial interpretation
may result as parties seek to delineate what effects may be considered by
the assessing entity when an assessment under the CEAA is triggered by
a different authorization on the Law List Regulations. The uncertainty
and the case law related to this jurisdictional friction point is yet another
reason for the increasing interest in cooperative environmental assessment processes.
II. The Development of CooperativeEnvironmental
Assessment Processes
As a result, at least in part, of these jurisdictional friction points and the
risk of costly legal challenges, there has been an increasing trend toward
cooperative environmental assessment processes. Prior to 1989, only five
joint panel reviews had been undertaken under the EARPGO. In the
period between 1989 and 1990, fourteen further joint panel reviews were
either announced or completed.22 With the promulgation of the CEAA,
joint review panels were given a clear statutory basis. Section 40 of the
CEAA provides for joint review panels on a case by case basis, while s.
58(l)(c) permits the Minister of the Environment to enter into federalprovincial agreements or arrangements for assessment processes.
Similarly, the legislation implementing the two Atlantic accords
allows for cooperative environmental assessment processes. For example, under the Canada-NewfoundlandAtlantic Accord ImplementationAct, the Canada-Newfoundland Offshore PetroleumBoard (CNOPB)
is required to avoid duplication of work and activities and to "conclude
with appropriate departments and agencies of the Government of Canada
and of the Government of the Province memoranda of understanding in
relation to environmental regulation" and "such other matters as are
appropriate".2 3 Both offshore regions have the ability to coordinate an
assessment process and ensure duplication is avoided.
In January 1998 the members of the Canadian Council of Ministers of
the Environment (CCME), with the exception of Qu6bec, approved the
Canada-Wide Accord on Environmental Harmonization and a number of
sub-agreements. On the same date the parties signed a sub-agreement on
22. Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office, Bulletin of Initial Assessment
Decisions and Panel Review, 6th ed. at 3.
23. S.C. 1987, c. 3.There is a similar section in the Canada-NovaScotia Offshore Petroleum
Resources Accord ImplementationAct, supra note 4. Mirror provincial legislation has also
been enacted in both cases.
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environmental assessment which aimed to realize "better environment,
protection by promoting cooperation, achieving efficiency and greatc
certainty in environmental assessment processes and establishing ac
countability in environmental assessments involving more than on
24
jurisdiction.
The sub-agreement applies if there are two or more government
required by law to assess the same proposed project. It does not appl
where environmental assessment processes are already in place as a resu,
of aboriginal land claims or self-government agreements." The sui
agreement provides for a common framework under which bilaterE
agreements can be developed between the federal government an
individual provinces and territories. A number of bilateral agreement
26
have been concluded or are in process.
Experience under these bilateral agreements is greatest in Britis'
Columbia where an agreement has been in place since 1997. Nin
cooperative environmental assessments have been completed in thE
province and four project reviews were underway in early 2000.27 Th
first project assessment under the Canada-Alberta agreement has beei
28
commenced.
In general terms, the agreements provide for notification and coopera
tion between federal and provincial departments and agencies whei
undertaking assessments. Each agreement is different, with the result tha
the provisions of each must be carefully reviewed to understand th
strength of the obligations to be met by the participating parties. With th
development of both a legislative basis and a policy framework support
ing cooperative environmental assessment processes, it is clear tha
formal interjurisdictional cooperation will play an increasing role i
environmental assessments.

24. Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment, "Two-year Review of Canada-Wid
Accord on Environmental Harmonization" (Ottawa: CCME, 2000) at 4.
25.

Ibid. at 5.

26. Canada-British Columbia: The Canada-British Columbia Agreement for Environment;
Assessment Cooperation has been in place since April of 1997 and the parties have agreed th;
it meets the requirements of the sub-agreement on environmental assessment. Canada-Albert
The Canada-Alberta Agreement for Environmental Assessment Cooperation was signed i
June 1999. It replaced an agreement concluded in 1993. Canada-Saskatchewan: The Cana&
Saskatchewan Agreement on Environmental Assessment Cooperation was signed in Noven
ber 1999. Canada-Manitoba: The Canada-Manitoba Agreement on Environmental Asses
ment Cooperation was signed on May 8, 2000. Canada-Ontario: Negotiations are underwa
between Canada and Ontario and it is hoped that an agreement can be finalized in 2000.
27.

Supra note 24.

28. Ibid. Further information on these agreements can be found on the Canada Environment
Assessment Agency website, online: <http://www.ceaa.gc.ca>.
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III. CooperativeEnvironmentalAssessments of Oil and Gas Projects
Historically there has been ongoing informal cooperation between the
federal and provincial departments and agencies involved in the environmental assessment of energy projects. For example, the National Energy
Board (NEB) has cooperated with the provinces in a number of informal
ways in relation to environmental assessments. Informal processes have
included requesting applicants to provide correspondence and minutes of
meetings with provincial agencies and departments; requiring applicants
to follow up on provincial concerns; ensuring information is made
available to the province; requiring the filing of environmental impact
assessments considered by the province; suggesting the province meet
with the other responsible authorities to discuss joint issues with an
assessment; and coordinating processes so that parties can deal with a
single window."
In addition to these informal cooperative mechanisms, there have been
three formal cooperative federal-provincial environmental assessment
processes under the CEAA for oil or gas projects. The first was a joint
federal-provincial offshore board panel review under the aegis of the
CEAA of the Sable Offshore Energy Project/Maritimes and Northeast
Pipeline Project (Sable Gas Project). The second project involved the
CNOPB and entailed a CNOPB/CEAA/Newfoundland assessment for
the Terra Nova Development project (Terra Nova Project). The final
project is a new proposal for a pipeline across Georgia Strait (Georgia
Strait Project). At the time this article was written the NEB and the British
Columbia Environmental Assessment Office had concluded an agreement for the cooperative environmental assessment of the proposal by
way of a comprehensive study report. This agreement represented a new
step in cooperative environmental assessment processes as the prior
processes had been tied to panel reviews. Since that time the project has
been referred by the federal Minister of the Environment for a panel
review. As British Columbia has no requirement under its legislation to
undertake an environmental assessment of the project, it is anticipated the
panel review will not be a joint federal-provincial panel review.
Although it remains early days in the development of cooperative
environmental assessment processes for oil and gas projects, some
observations on these cooperative processes can be made.
IV. Cooperative EnvironmentalAssessments of Oil and Gas Projects
- Issues and Considerations

As a result of the three cooperative environmental assessment processes
developed to date and some of the informal cooperative processes relied
'upon by the NEB, some practical and legal issues and considerations have
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arisen which should be taken into account when considering or trying t(
develop cooperative environmental assessment processes.
1. Partiesto the Agreement
One of the first issues that can arise is who should be invited to participate
in developing the necessary agreements and terms of reference. Under the
CEAA it is possible that each federal authority responsible for undertak.
ing an environmental assessment of the project (i.e. a responsible authority) can seek to be involved in the negotiations, even if it has no right tc
be a signatory to the ultimate agreement.2 9 As well, the provincial
government or provincial assessment office and the Canadian Environ.
mental Assessment Agency may wish to contribute to the negotiation ol
the agreement. The relevant offshore board and the NEB will usually see
themselves as key players and various federal or provincial departments
may take the view that they have a role to play. In the result, the first task
is to sort out who should be involved in the initial meetings to discuss the
options for a cooperative assessment. This can, understandably, be E
delicate process and involve a number of political sensitivities.
In the case of the Terra Nova Project, a proposal to develop the
petroleum resources for the Terra Nova oil field on the northeast Grand
Banks of Newfoundland, the CNOPB, the federal Ministers of Environment and Natural Resources and the provincial Ministers of Environmen
and Labour, Mines and Energy and Intergovernmental Affairs signed the
Memorandum of Understanding establishing the assessment. In the case
of the Sable Gas Project, applications were submitted to three regulatorD
agencies - the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board
(CNSOPB), the NEB and the Nova Scotia Energy and Mineral Resource
Conservation Board - for projects that involved the construction ol
offshore and onshore facilities for the drilling, production, transmissior
and processing of natural gas. Gas and associated natural gas liquids were
to be collected from offshore production platforms and brought ashore by
means of a submarine pipeline to a gas plant in Nova Scotia. Gas would
be processed and then transported via an onshore pipeline to Canadiar
and American markets. An agreement for a joint public review of the
proposal was entered into among the Ministers of Environment fol
Canada and Nova Scotia, the Ministers of Natural Resources for CanadE
and Nova Scotia, the Chairman of the NEB and the Acting Chie
Executive Officer of the CNSOPB.

29. The CEAA provides that the Minister of the Environment is the federal party responsibl
for joint environmental assessment processes, however other government departments argu
ably have input into the scoping decision pursuant to s. 15 of the CEAA.
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As earlier noted, the cooperative assessment initially explored in
relation to the proposal by Georgia Strait Crossing Pipeline Limited
differed from the Terra Nova Project and Sable Gas Project proposals as
it involved a comprehensive study and report rather than a joint panel
review. As well, there were fewer parties negotiating the agreement. The
proposal involved the construction of a gas pipeline from Washington
State across the Strait of Georgia and onto Vancouver Island. The onshore
portion would be approximately 13 kilometres in length and in early 2000
a project description was filed with the NEB to start the assessment
process. In addition to the NEB, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans
(DFO) subsequently identified itself as a possible responsible authority
required to ensure the assessment of the project under the CEAA. The
Canada-British Columbia Subsidiary Agreement for Environmental
Assessment Cooperation required that the NEB and DFO notify the
province of the project. The subsidiary agreement allowed for the
inclusion of the province in the environmental assessment process for the
project whether or not it had a trigger under provincial assessment
legislation. After several months of negotiations, the province entered
into a Memorandum of Understanding with the NEB, the Assessment
Office of the province and DFO to coordinate its participation in the
preparation of the comprehensive study report, if that were the assessment option chosen. As the NEB ultimately referred the proposal to the
Minister of the Environment for referral to a panel review, there was no
need to implement the agreement.
2. Time Required to Develop CooperativeEnvironmentalAssessment
Processes
Practically, the development of cooperative environmental assessment
processes takes both the time and the resources of the government entities
involved. While a relatively simple agreement such as the one entered
into for the Georgia Strait Project may take only a matter of months, more
diverse projects involving a range of government departments and
agencies can take well over a year. Counsel and others involved in the
Terra Nova Project and Sable Gas Project processes have commented on
the lengthy lead time required to both establish the processes to be used
in the cooperative environmental assessment and to formalize them in a
memorandum of understanding.
From the proponent's point of view this can be an important practical
consideration. In a competitive business environment a delay in the
assessment of a proposal can render the proposal moot. A proponent may
prefer the risk of jurisdictional challenge to the loss of opportunity that
can result if an unusually lengthy period is required for project assess-

98

The Dalhousie Law Journal

ment. Therefore it may not immediately see any advantage resulting from
attempts to coordinate cooperative environmental assessment processes.
If cooperative environmental assessment processes are increasingly
the assessment mechanism used by federal and provincial departments
and agencies, these practical considerations should diminish as precedents are established, agreements executed and cooperative environmental assessment processes streamlined. For example, s. 59(i)(v) of the
CEAA establishes the power to make regulations to adapt the CEAA
assessment process for the offshore boards. However, in the last few years
government resources have generally shrunk, not expanded, with the
result that the importance of these practical restraints should not be
underestimated. They can constitute an impediment to the development
of new ways of carrying out assessments or can mean that it takes longer
to develop and implement new procedures and precedents.
3. Melding Different Proceduresand Processes
Melding the various assessment and regulatory processes established by
the different levels of government into a cooperative process and ensuring the necessary requirements of natural justice are met can be a
challenge. This is particularly true when there is a quasi-judicial regulatory procedure with an environmental component that is also being
accommodated within the cooperative process as was the case in the
Sable Gas Project proposal. The NEB, as a quasi-judicial tribunal, has
always run its hearings on the basis of the presentation of sworn evidence
tested by cross-examination followed by final argument. Upon occasion,
up to a week of hearing time has been consumed by the presentation and
consideration of preliminary motions. Most environmental hearings, on
the other hand, proceed on the basis of presentations by the proponent and
other interested parties. Evidence is rarely sworn and cross-examination
is infrequent. Proceedings often follow a "town hall meeting" format and
motions and objections based on legal arguments or principles are rare.
The agreement for the review of the Sable Gas Project proposal
provided that the review would meet the requirements of the CEAA, the
Nova Scotia EnvironmentAct and the NationalEnergy BoardAct.30 In
addition, the review would meet the requirements of the CNSOPB and its
appointed Commissioner under the Canada-NovaScotia Offshore Petroleum ResourcesAccord ImplementationAct and the Canada-NovaScotia
Offshore PetroleumAccord Implementation (Nova Scotia)Act.3

30. R.S.C. 1985, c. N-7 [hereinafterNEB Act].
31. Supra note 4. The Nova Scotia legislation mirrors the federal legislation.
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The hearings were held in four Atlantic communities and went from
early April to mid-July 1997. The proceedings resulted in excess of
12,000 pages of hearing transcripts. The procedures adopted for the
hearing were those set out in the NationalEnergy BoardRules ofPractice
andProcedure,1995.32 While a number of informal community sessions
were held, most of the hearing was conducted pursuant to the NEB' s usual
processes. This introduced a structured approach to an environmental
assessment process that had historically been informal. As noted by Dr.
Foumier,33 chair of the Sable Gas Project review panel, "[c]riticisms
received during and after the process included the following: daunting,
intimidating, complex, legalistic, adversarial, inaccessible and formal."
However, in his view, these criticisms were not justified. For example, in
relation to the requirement that intervenors who wished to fully participate in the proceedings must register to do so, he commented that "[i]t
quickly became clear that this mechanism was the first step toward
introducing rigor into a process which had considerable potential to be
chaotic.... It was the first orderly step in the creation of an information
exchange process."34 He went on to point out that, "given the financial,
environmental and social stakes involved and with their attendant emotions, the formality encourages a civility and decorum, which aids the
process. In other words it helps to defuse the emotion. . . "" On the
subject of cross-examination he noted that it "proved to be probably the
single most useful tool to separate anecdote and hearsay from factually
verifiable testimony".36 Whether or not one agrees with his assessment
of the process, it is clear it engendered considerable comment.
In the case of the Terra Nova Project proposal, the CNOPB did not
require that the public hearings follow a quasi-judicial format, nor did any
other party to the Memorandum of Understanding. In the result, while
there was the ability to take sworn testimony, the process used followed
the more traditional format of presentations by the proponent in each
hearing site followed by presentations by interested parties. There were
no formal motions made by the parties to the panel and there was no
criticism by the participants of the process itself.37 The proceedings were
held in four Newfoundland communities and took seven days. Approximately twenty people made oral submissions and over seventy written
submissions were received.

32. S.O.R./95-208.

33. Letter from Dr. Fournier to Ken Vollman, Chair of the NEB (13 January 2000).
34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Comment of Angus Taylor, General Counsel to the CNOPB.
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Under the Georgia Strait Project agreement a procedure was established if the assessment was to be undertaken by way of a comprehensive
study.3" The comprehensive study report was to be prepared by the
proponent prior to the commencement of the hearing under the NEB Act.
As a result, there would be no hearing process in conjunction with the
preparation of the report and therefore there was no specific allowance for
formal presentations by interested parties. However, the proponent was
asked to involve the public in the comprehensive study and the preparation of the report, although the method of involvement was not mandated.
It was anticipated that the comprehensive study report would ultimately
be filed by the proponent as part of its environmental evidence in support
of its application for a certificate under the NEB Act. At that stage
intervenors with concerns that had not been addressed could choose to
become involved in the NEB hearing process, which would be conducted
according to the National Energy Board Rules of Practiceand Procedure, 1995.
Arguments can be made in support of both formal and informal
processes, and there is likely no clear answer as to which is preferable.
There are advantages and drawbacks to both. However, when a quasijudicial process is melded with a more informal environmental assessment process, the safer course of action is to follow the stricter process to
ensure the necessary natural justice requirements are met. To do otherwise would put the process at risk and threaten the validity of any ultimate
decision. Furthermore, within that stricter process there is usually still
room to accommodate and assist participants who are not lawyers and
find the proceedings difficult.3 9 It must be recognized, however, that the
adoption of a more formal process can cause a level of discomfort in
parties to the joint assessment agreement who are more used to an
informal model.
4. Legislated ProceduralDifferences
Even with the adoption of a prescribed process for the conduct of the joint
assessment process, in some instances there can be legislated procedural
differences in the various statutes underpinning the joint process. To date
this issue has not arisen in relation to the joint hearings for the Sable Gas
and Terra Nova Projects. An obvious example is the different wording
38. As noted earlier, on 28 September 2000 the National Energy Board referred the matter
to the Minister of the Environment for referral to a panel review.
39. For example, the NEB has established processes where intervenors who merely wished
to "have their say" could avoid being served with all of the documentation filed by parties,
register at the door when the hearing came to their town, obtain an approximate time for their
participation and, with the assistance of board counsel, advise of their concerns. In one case a
nervous intervenor waited in the bar until board staff advised that they were "on"!
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utilized under ss. 16.1 of the NEB Act and 35(4) of the CEAA for the test
to decide on the confidentiality of evidence. Section 16.1 of the NEB Act

provides:
In any proceedings under this Act, the Board may take any measures and
make any order that it considers necessary to ensure the confidentiality of
any information likely to be disclosed in the proceedings if the Board is
satisfied that:
(a)disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to
result in a material loss or gain to a person directly affected by the
proceedings, or could reasonably be expected to prejudice the
person's competitive position; or
(b)the information is financial, commercial, scientific or technical
information that is confidential information supplied to the Board
and
(i) the information has been consistently treated as confidential
information by a person directly affected by the proceedings, and
(ii) the Board considers that the person's interest in confidentiality outweighs the public interest in disclosure of the proceedings.
Section 35 of the CEAA provides in part:
(3) A hearing by a review panel shall be public unless the panel is
satisfied after representations made by a witness that specific,
direct and substantial harm would be caused to the witness by
the disclosure of the evidence, documents or other things that
the witness is ordered to give or produce pursuant to subsection
(1).
(4) Where a review panel is satisfied that the disclosure of evidence,
documents or other things would cause specific, direct and
substantial harm to a witness, the evidence, documents or things
are privileged and shall not, without the authorization of the
witness, knowingly be or be permitted to be communicated,
disclosed or made available by any person who has obtained the
evidence, documents or other things pursuant to this Act.
It remains to be seen if the tests in the two statutes can work together, or
if they are different to the extent that material may be held confidential
under one while it must be released under the other. Arguably, in the latter
case, the test that grants confidentiality would govern, but this has yet to
be determined.
This is but one example. There may be other instances where legislated
procedural differences contained in enabling legislation or relevant
regulations could lead to a joint panel having to rule on complex issues
of interpretation, with the resultant risk of a successful legal challenge of
the process. It will take some time, and perhaps ultimately some legislative amendments, for these issues to be resolved. While increasingly
statutes are permitting or encouraging cooperative assessment pro-
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cesses, 40 a detailed review of possible procedural anomalies has not
occurred.
5. Mandate of Panel Members
Cooperative environmental assessment panels can be put together in a
number of ways. One option is to put the panel together for administrative
purposes only. For example, a five-member panel could be made up of
two provincial members required to report back on environmental
matters to the province, two federal members required to prepare an
environmental assessment report under the CEAA, and a member of a
regulatory tribunal mandated to make a decision on a number of matters,
including environmental concerns, under the tribunal's enabling legislation. While in theory it would appear that with such a panel some
administrative expediencies could occur, the procedural implications are
significant. In theory each group with a separate mandate within the panel
might be required to rule on a procedural motion. If different rulings
resulted, the proceedings could be disrupted, with panel members, for
example, effecting exits and entrances as certain evidence is presented.
Furthermore, considerable effort would be required to ensure that the rule
of naturalj ustice that "he who hears must decide" is observed. The normal
collegial atmosphere of the panel would be lost as certain panel members
would not be free to discuss the matters before them with other members
of the panel. In short, legally and logistically a panel of this sort presents
numerous challenges.
Unlike the case with the subsequent Sable Gas Project panel, these
problems were avoided with the Terra Nova Project panel, as each panel
member had identical joint responsibilities and a single report was
prepared which would satisfy the requirements of the CanadianEnvironment Assessment Act, the CNOPB and the province of Newfoundland.
The situation was not as straightforward in the Sable Gas Project
cooperative assessment. By agreement ajoint review panel was struck. It
consisted of two full-time NEB members, a third member who sat as a
temporary member of the NEB and as a member of the federal-provincial
joint panel, one member who sat on the joint review panel and was a
Commissioner under the accord legislation, and one member who sat
solely on the joint review panel. All five had a shared mandate as
members of the cooperative environmental assessment panel. Clause 5.2
of the agreement provided:

40.

See e.g. the Canada-NewfoundlandAtlantic Accord Implementation Act, supra note 4,

s. 46, which requires an MOU for a cooperative process be pursued to "ensure effective
coordination and [to] avoid duplication of work and activities."

Cooperative Environmental Assessments: Their Increasing Role in Oil and
Gas Projects

103

The Panel shall consist of five (5) members for the Review of the
Projects:
(a) two (2) members shall be permanent members of the NEB;
(b) one member shall satisfy the eligibility requirements for a temporary
member of the NEB and shall be jointly nominated by the Environment Ministers, the CNSOPB and the Chairman of the NEB. A
request shall be made to the Minister of Natural Resources to
recommend to the Governor in Council the appointment of that
proposed member as a temporary member of the NEB. Should that
proposed member's appointment as a temporary member of the
NEB be confirmed, that member shall be appointed to the Panel by
the Environment Ministers;
(c) one member shall be jointly appointed by the Environment Ministers and the CNSOPB. For the Offshore Project only, the member
jointly appointed under this paragraph will also be acting as a
Commissioner pursuant to the Accord Acts, and
(d) one member shall be jointly appointed by the Environment Ministers.
The agreement provided that the public review would allow for the
collection and examination of environmental evidence and the hearing of
argument on the environmental effects of the projects for the use and
subsequent deliberations and decision making on the applications by
regulatory authorities. It also provided a forum for the Commissioner to
distribute publicly the development application, and further permitted the
collection of information in relation to the development application for
use in subsequent deliberations and recommendations to the CNSOPB.
The shared mandate of all of the panel members under the CEAA, and
the requirement in the agreement establishing the panel that the National
Energy Board Rules of Practiceand Procedure, 1995 would govern,
meant that procedural rulings could be made by the panel on ajoint basis.
It became apparent early on in the panel's mandate that it would be
difficult to separate the environmental evidence from the evidence
required by the panel members who had other responsibilities. For
example, there was considerable overlap and connection between the
evidence required for the environmental assessment and that required by
the NEB to consider the application to construct and operate the pipeline.
As a result, the panel decided that all members would all hear all of the
evidence, although this meant that care would need to be taken to ensure
that discussions among panel members were appropriate. Although
procedurally challenging, the evidence was collected on that basis.
Despite this successful precedent, the preferred structure for a cooperative assessment panel is doubtless one where all panel members have
identical mandates. Where mandates under several pieces of legislation
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are being carried out, it is preferable that each panel member be appointec
under each statute. Where jurisdictional, political, pragmatic or othei
reasons render this approach impossible, the parties to the agreement, the
proponent and the panel members should be aware of the difficult anc
awkward procedural machinations that may be required to ensure the
process is legally viable.
Even when all panel members in a cooperative assessment have
identical mandates, issues can arise. For example, it can be unclear wha
tests they are to apply or what interests, if any, they are to represent. Fo
example, under the NEB Act members of a panel generally consider an
application to construct a pipeline in light of the public convenience an
necessity. As a national board, the members often look to the Canadiar
public interest. When panel members also have a mandate under provincial or other legislation, the underlying test may be more local in nature.
The legislation governing the CNSOPB and CNOPB, 41 for example,
provides that a benefits plan must be approved by the board prior to the
approval of a development plan or the authorization of any work oi
activity.4 2 The benefits plan refers to benefits for both Canada and the
relevant province, but the emphasis is on the provision of employmeni
and other opportunities to citizens of the respective province.
Furthermore, members appointed as a result of their selection by the
federal or provincial governments may think that they are to "represen
the interests" of that constituency, with the result that the panel members
could have differing views of their mandates. If that were to occur the
jurisdictional friction points that were supposedly avoided by the cooperative assessment could move right into the assessment process itself,
Where there are different tests, or panel members perceive themselves a,
representing particular geographic interests, a question could arise as tc
how the tests or interests can be reconciled. However, these concerns are
mere supposition at this stage and have not been demonstrated b)
experience.
In the case of the Terra Nova Project assessment, all three pane]
members were long-time Newfoundlanders and their unanimous reporl
made it very clear that the benefits to the province were of significan
concern to them. In the Sable Gas Project cooperative assessment, two o
the members were with the NEB which is located in Calgary, one wa,
from New Brunswick and two were from Nova Scotia. In the words of the
Chair of the panel, Dr. Fournier of Nova Scotia,

41.

See ibid., s. 45.

42. This requirement can be waived. See ibid., s. 45(2), (6)(b).
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[the appointment of three local members to the five-member panel] gave
the affected Provinces a feeling of genuine representation with people who
knew and understood local issues and concerns .

. . The two [NEB]

regulators were also critical since they represented a great deal of
mix was
In general4 the
professional experience on issues and practice ....
3
very good and the personalities were pleasantly compatible.
The issue of panel composition was raised before the courts in the case
of the Express Pipeline Project joint panel review, the first joint panel
review under the CEAA. That panel was a joint federal panel under both
the CEAA and the NEB Act. It consisted of four members. Two members
were temporary appointments to the NEB and two were permanent
appointments. All four members were appointed as members of the joint
panel by the Minister of the Environment pursuant to the CEAA. After the
issuance of the joint panel report the constitution of the panel was
challenged." The applicant alleged that the joint panel was not properly
constituted because the panellists under the CEAA were also members of
the NEB and therefore there was a reasonable apprehension of bias. This
argument was rejected by the court during the oral hearing and then
summarily dismissed in the subsequent written reasons when the court
stated that the allegation made "nonsense of sections 40, 41 and 43 of the
[Canadian Environmental Assessment] Act. '45 This is the only case that
touches on panel composition and the role of the panels in both the Sable
Gas and Terra Nova Projects was not tested before the courts.
Lastly, where the cooperative assessment mechanism utilized is a
panel review, especially where it incorporates a regulatory process with
an environmental component (such as an NEB application), there can be
a difficult learning curve for panel members who may be used to different
procedures or who may be scientists who are unfamiliar with hearing
procedures and natural justice requirements. Their sole goal may be the
attainment of scientific truth, by their own independent research if
necessary! They may not realize that parties have a right to know the case
they have to meet. As a result there is a need for the careful and early
training of panel members, which again can take time.
Conclusion
In short, there is a need for careful legal advice when various regulatory
and assessment processes are combined to achieve administrative efficiencies and to enhance assessment processes. To date the case law
related to cooperative environmental assessment processes has been

43. Supra note 33.
44. Alberta Wilderness Assn. v. Express Pipelines(1996), 137 D.L.R. (4th) 177 (F.C.A.).
45. Ibid. at 18.
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primarily focussed on joint panel reviews. While there has been som,
4
litigation targeted at assessment issues contained in joint panel reports,
there has been little about issues related to the establishment of panels fo
joint assessments. In part this could be a result of s. 42 of the CEAA.
Where the Minister establishes a review panel jointly with a jurisdiction
referred to in subsection 40(1), the assessment conducted by that panel
shall be deemed to satisfy any requirements of this Act and the regulations
respecting assessments by a review panel.
One commentator has noted that one apparent purpose of this section i
to protect assessments conducted by properly constituted joint panel
from successful challenges on minor procedural grounds.47 Both th
Terra Nova and Sable Gas Project cooperative assessments engenderef
legal challenges, but, as earlier noted, neither related to the compositioi
of the panel or the cooperative assessment process itself.
In the case of the challenge to the Terra Nova Project, two partie
sought to remove a limitation in the terms of reference that precluded thi
panel from examining the questions of energy policy, jurisdiction, and thl
fiscal and royalty regimes. 48 Their application was dismissed as being, ii
part, unnecessary and premature. 49 After the conclusion of the Sable Ga
Project joint review panel and the issuance of the report, the Industria
Cape Breton Community Alliance Group on the Sable Gas Projec
launched actions in the Federal Court of Appeal" and the Supreme Cour
of Nova Scotia. It argued that several errors had occurred, including ai
error ofjurisdiction when the panel failed to require a full socio-economil
analysis of the effects of the Sable Gas Project on Cape Breton Island. I]
the course of his reasons, released October 20, 2000, McKay J. found tha
where the review panel, composed of accepted experts, acts within it
jurisdiction the courts will give significant deference to its decision
However a question of law concerning the jurisdiction of the panel wi]
be assessed against the standard of correctness.

46. Industrial Cape Breton Community Alliance Group on the Sable Gas Project v. Sabi
Offshore Energy Project, [2000] F.C.J. No. 1669 (F.C.T.D.) [hereinafter Sable]. Albert
Wilderness Assn. v. CardinalRiver Coals, [1999] 3 F.C. 425 (F.C.T.D).
47. CEAA, An Annotated Guide, supra note 8 at 11-108.
48. Corbett v. Canada (Canada-Nfld. Offshore Petroleum Board), (1997), St. John's N(

0370 (Nfld. S.C.T.D.).
49. A subsequent case, St. John's (City of) v. Canada (Canada-Newfoundland Offsho?
Petroleum Board) and The Proponentsof the Terra Nova Oil and Gas Field Developmen
[1998] N.J. No. 233 (Nfld. S.C.T.D.), sought to have the board enforce a condition of tl

employment benefits plan and was therefore not tied to the cooperative assessment proces!
50. Subsequently moved to the Federal Court Trial Division, Sable, supranote 46. See as we
the proceedings in the Nova Scotia courts, Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, Court File N1
145185 which is unlikely to proceed.
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This is not the first case where the courts have been reluctant to
overturn assessments on the basis of errors in the assessment itself and
have deferred to the scientific expertise of the assessing body. 5' Therefore, when faced with an unfavourable decision, intervenors may
increasingly look to overturn decisions on the basis of procedural errors.
As a result, cooperative environmental assessment processes are likely to
come under increasing judicial scrutiny in the future.
One case of interest on the issue of cooperative assessment processes
is the CanadianEnvironmentalLaw Association v. Canada (Ministerof
Environment).52 In that case the applicant challenged the validity of a
number of intergovernmental environmental agreements including the
Canada-Wide Accord on Environmental Harmonization and the subagreement on the harmonization of federal and provincial environmental
assessment processes. The case was dismissed at the Trial Division level,
a decision which was upheld by the Federal Court of Appeal. 53 In the
course of giving the unanimous judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal,
Linden J. noted "we see no legal difficulties, at this time, in this effort to
coordinate and cooperate, which is the main purpose of the accords. 54
Simply put, the judicial view to date appears to be supportive, even
encouraging," of cooperative environmental assessment processes.
In summary, the benefits of "one window" assessment, which include
the possible avoidance of jurisdictional concerns, the completeness of
environmental impact assessments and the avoidance ofinterjurisdictional
duplication and overlap, are clear. However, it is likely still too early to
determine if those benefits can be fully realized in light of some of the
impediments to success.
With time, a number of the present problems with cooperative assessment processes may be addressed. The greater use of cooperative environmental assessment processes by federal and provincial departments
and agencies can result in the establishment of process "precedents"
which will reduce the time and resources required by the parties to initiate
the process. If that occurs, the use of cooperative environmental assessment processes will likely increase and the concerns of proponents about
the time required to implement new processes may diminish. The need to
ensure that new processes do not violate the rules of natural justice or the
statutory requirements of the cooperating federal and provincial depart-

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See e.g. supra note 44.
[1999] 3 F.C.R. 564 (F.C.T.D.).
[2000] F.C.J. No. 821 (A-327-99) (F.C.A.).
Ibid. at para. 5.
Oldman River, supra note 1.
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ments or agencies will continue, but the effort necessary to accomplisl
this objective could be minimized. This can occur as a result of the
increased experience that will come as a result of the greater use of such
mechanisms. As well, some legislative amendments may be required tc
smooth out any conflicting statutory overlaps. Finally, while such cooperative assessment mechanisms may avoid jurisdictional friction points
and therefore reduce the risk of legal challenge of an environmental
assessment onthe basis of constitutional issues it should not be forgotten
that it may increase the number of legal challenges of the cooperative
environmental assessment processes utilized. Parties unhappy with a
substantive environmental decision and frustrated by the courts' deference toward such decisions, may increasingly look to procedural issues
as a method to overturn the decision. The case law on jurisdictional
friction points related to environmental impact assessment may be
replaced by case law that examines procedural friction points.

